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THE FAILING COMPANY DOCTRINE REVISITED
RICHARD E. LOW*
The conclusion seems inescapable that the failing company doctrine has no
logical basis as it is usually stated ... the interpretation and application
of any doctrine becomes difficult indeed in the absence of a rational basis
for it. It is impossible to determine whether any particular factor fits into
the doctrine's purpose if that purpose is not known.1
I. INTRODUCTION
F the two years since the above statement appeared in this Review, the
failing company defense in merger cases has received more significant
judicial and administrative interpretation than in the 37 years since its
formulation. In the past year both the Supreme Court2 and the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) have considered its scope and apparently have
limited its application. The FTC, in both its majority and minority opin-
ions in United States Steel Corp.,3 moved toward a more rational appli-
cation of the doctrine. Unfortunately, however, Mr. Justice Douglas'
majority opinion in Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States4 was so weak
logically that it seemed to support some of the recent adverse views on
the antitrust record of the Warren Court.' Simply stated, the doctrine is
that the merger of a "failing company" under certain conditions does not
violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act."
The recent narrowing of the applicability of the failing company doc-
trine may actually result in its more frequent acceptance by the courts.
* Associate Professor of Economics, Graduate School of Business Administration,
Rutgers, The State University; member of the New York Bar.
1. United States Steel Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. ff 18,626, at 20,981 n.13 (FTC 1969)
quoting Low, The Failing Company Doctrine: An Iliusive Economic Defense Under Section
7 of the Clayton Act, 35 Fordham L. Rev. 425, 430 (1967).
2. Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 US. 131 (1969). Mr. Justice Harlan
concurred in a way which disassociated himself from the majority's views on the failing
company doctrine; Mr. Justice Stewart dissented; Mr. Justice Fortas did not participate.
3. United States Steel Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. U 18,626, at 20,974 (FTC 1969). Chair-
man Dixon and Commissioner Jones were in the majority; Commissioner Elman dissented;
Commissioners MacIntyre and Nicholson did not participate.
4. 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
5. E.g., Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism
and Cynicism, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 325 (1968). "[IJf, as has been suggested, the road to
hell is paved with good intentions, the Warren Court has been among the great roadbuilders
of all time." Kurland, Earl Warren, The "Warren Court," And the Warren Myths, 67 Mich.
L. Rev. 353, 357 (1968).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). The doctrine was first laid down by the Supreme Court in
International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930). Neither the meaning of "failing" nor
the certain circumstances concerned were defined.
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To date the doctrine has won very few judicial victbries. Its main
triumphs have been in winning FTC or Justice Department approval of
mergers under the advance clearance programs of those agencies. 8 But
it may well be that the hitherto very broad definitions of the doctrine
have made courts reluctant to apply it in today's antimerger judicial
atmosphere. A stricter definition may thus result in more frequent judi-
cial, though fewer administrative victories for the doctrine.
Two years ago there were three major areas of confusion concerning
the failing company doctrine. The first involved whether it was necessary
to demonstrate the absence of a preferable prospective purchaser before a
merger could be approved under the doctrine. This problem has been
resolved in the affirmative. In the light of this resolution, however, the
subsidiary question of proving the unavailability of such a purchaser has
become more important and, how to answer it, more uncertain.
The second major area of confusion, the reason for the doctrine, and
thus the objective around which subsidiary questions could be argued,
has advanced in clarity at the FTC, but retreated disastrously at the
Supreme Court.
The third major area of confusion, how to decide whether a company
is actually "failing", has had relatively little clarification.
II. THE No OTHER PROSPECTIVE PURCHASER REQUIREMENT
In International Shoe Co. v. FTC' the Supreme Court found that no
other prospective purchaser of the failing company existed. The Court,
however, did not indicate whether this factor was vital to its decision.
Consequently, as of two years ago there was still uncertainty as to
whether this was a necessary condition of the failing company doctrine,"
although there was a tendency for commentators to assume that it was."
This question was apparently settled in Citizen. In deciding that the doc-
trine's requirements had not been met, the Court stated that:
The failing company doctrine plainly cannot be applied in a merger or in any other
case unless it is established that the company that acquires the failing company or
7. "Many have tried this defense but with almost total lack of success." Robinson,
Antitrust-Horizontal and Vertical Mergers Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 36 U.
Mo. (K.C.) L. Rev. 75, 82 (1968).
8. See Hale and Hale, Failing Firms and the Merger Provisions of the Antitrust Laws,
52 Ky. L.J. 597 (1964); Comment, The Impact of the "Failing Company Doctrine" in
the Federal Trade Commission's Premerger Clearance Program, 19 Syracuse L. Rev. 911
(1968).
9. 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930).
10. See Low, supra note 1, at 432-34.
11. See, e.g., Thomas, Conglomerate Merger Syndrome-A Comparison: Congressional
Policy with Enforcement Policy, 36 Fordham L. Rev. 461, 548 (1968).
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brings it under dominion is the only available purchaser. For if another person or
group could be interested, a unit in the competitive system would be preserved and
not lost to monopoly power.' 2
But beyond this preliminary resolution, no other related problems were
solved. How was the absence of another prospective purchaser to be
shown? Where more than one prospective purchaser existed, was the fail-
ig company doctrine inapplicable or only applicable to one of the pros-
pective purchasers, presumably the one whose purchase would have the
least anticompetitive effect? And how would the least anticompetitive
effect be proven?
The majority and minority in Citizen primarily disputed the type of
proof that a defendant had to offer to establish a failing company defense.
According to Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent: 3
Today's decision for the first time lays down the blanket rule that the failing company
defense is forfeited by a company which cannot show that it made substantial affir-
mative efforts to sell to a noncompetitor.'
4
The majority, by stressing the need for "substantial affirmative efforts to
sell," seemed to follow a view of the Department of Justice which argued
in a recent case that failure to retain a broker for selling or failure to
advertise for sale demonstrated that a firm had not really sought an
alternative purchaser.' 5 This argument was maintained in the face of
12. 394 U.S. at 138. In Citizen the two firms concerned were the only two newspapers
in Tucson, Arizona. If any other prospective purchaser existed, it would have had to be
an outsider. Many times, however, this is not the case. Beyond Citizen's particular facts, Mr.
justice Douglas' second sentence above is a complete non sequitur.
The Justice Department's 1968 guidelines also endorse the need for "good faith efforts ...
to elicit a reasonable offer of acquisition more consistent with the purposes of Section
7 ... ." Merger Guidelines, 1 Trade Reg. Rep. g 4430, at 6684 (Dep't Justice 1968).
13. Justice Stewart, like the majority, accepted the necessity of showing that no other
prospective purchaser exists. 394 U.S. at 143. Hrs major objection to the Court's holding,
however, was that being new, it was retroactive. He argued that it should be applied only
prospectively. Id.
Both Justice Stewart and the majority overstated the desirability of a conglomerate
purchaser. While it is certainly likely that a conglomerate merger would be less anticom-
petitive than a horizontal one, such a conclusion is by no means automatic, and may
run counter, in many cases, to the alleged dangers of conglomerate mergers. See, eg.,
FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965). Both Justices Douglas and Stewart
incorrectly assumed that this conglomerate twist to the "no other prospective purchaser"
requirement was the law at that time.
14. 394 US. at 143. The burden of bringing forth the evidence, however severe that
burden, is of course on the defendant since the failing company doctrine is an affirmative
defense.
15. Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Defendant's Failing
Company Defense by the United States at 10, United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 296 F.
Supp. 944 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
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considerable evidence of other attempts to sell, and despite the argument
that too much publicity regarding the desire to sell would bring down
creditors like hawks, and alienate customers interested in long term
business relationships. 6
A literal reading of the Supreme Court's decision in Citizen gives the
impression, therefore, that the existence of another prospective purchaser
destroys the defense rather than raises the question of which purchase
would have the least anticompetitive effect. There seems to be no reason,
however, for the court to have concluded that the failing company doc-
trine was inapplicable merely because more than one prospective pur-
chaser existed, unless the Court had fallen into the logical error of assum-
ing that the presence of such multiple prospective purchasers means that
the firm is not failing.'7 Any illumination by reference does not exist, for
the Court, in a footnote,'8 referred to only two lower court decisions in
which this doctrine was applied. In one of these cases, the lower court
ignored the entire "no other prospective purchaser" requirement," and
in the other, it applied the natural monopoly 20 rather than the failing com-
pany defense. Hopefully the Court has been misread in this matter, for
such a requirement as an absolute makes no sense at all. As one eviden-
tiary consideration among others it would be more rational.
The FTC, however, fell into no such error. Both the majority and
minority opinions in United States Steel Corp. went to the other extreme.
They maintained that though the failing firm turned down other bids and
borrowed money through the influence of the ultimate purchaser in an
attempt to remain independent, its failing status was not affected in the
absence of evidence that it really had not tried to remain independent.2 '
The present law concerning the "no other prospective purchaser" re-
quirement appears to be, therefore, that such a requirement does exist,
whatever its form, and that the failing company must make strong
affirmative efforts to attract other prospective purchasers. These efforts
must be made irrespective of the harmful effects on the company's busi-
ness prospects, on its chances to survive or sell, and regardless of the
wasted effort these attempts may involve. The existence of other prospec-
tive purchasers means either that the defense fails-a position with no
16. Reply Brief for Defendant at 25-26, United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 296 F. Supp.
994 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
17. See Low, supra note 1, at 434.
18. 394 U.S. at 136 n.2.
19. United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers' Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799, 808
(D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
20. Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers, 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 833 (1961). See Low, supra note 1, at 431.
21. United States Steel Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. ff 18,626, at 20,974 (FTC 1969).
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logic, but some authority--or that the purchaser whose acquisition would
have the least anticompetitive effect must be chosen. How to determine
which purchaser would have the least anticompetitive effect, or whether a
minimum purchase price is required, is unclear. And conglomerate pur-
chasers seem to be preferred, absolutely by authority and presumptively
by logic.
III. THE LOGIcAL BASES OF THE DOcTRINE
The quotation opening this article makes the obvious, but often over-
looked, point that particular problems concerning legal doctrines cannot
be resolved logically if the purpose of the doctrine is unknown. I have
suggested two possible underlying bases of the failing company doctrine. 22
Both have undergone startling changes in the last two years. These bases
were that the merger of a failing company could not have the adverse
impact on competition necessary to violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
and the historic fact that Congress, in amending Section 7 in 1950, clearly
incorporated a failing company exception into the meaning (although not
into the language) of the statute itself.
According to the FTC:
In reviewing the opinions of the lower courts and other agencies, and legal arti-
des published since the Supreme Court's statement in International Shoe, we have
noted a reliance on an unexplained proposition that the acquisition of a failing com-
pany could not possibly substantially injure competition. Such holdings have led one
commentator to observe: "[T]he defense is no stronger than the validity of that
presumed lack of impact, and, in the author's view, the presumption is seldom, if ever,
valid. Yet, customarily, whenever a reason for the doctrine is demanded, this invalid
basis is presented as truth .... It is difficult to refute an argument whose advocates
advance no logical reason in support of it."23
The FTC then proceeded to list a long series of situations in which
the merger of a failing company may substantially lessen competition.
These included instances where a shortage of capital prevents a company
from developing valuable patents or know-how, or where a "dominant"
firm is able through buying a failing one to meet orders it could not fill if
dependent on the slow process of internal expansion (both examples from
horizontal mergers); where the purchases of the failing firm are fore-
closed by the buyer or where the acquiring firm achieves an integrated
advantage over its nonintegrated rivals (both examples from vertical
mergers) .24
22. Low, supra note 1, at 427-30.
23. United States Steel Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. U 18,626, at 20,982 (FTC 1969), quoting
Low, supra note 1, at 428.
24. United States Steel Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. I9 18,626, at 20,982 (FTC 1969).
1969]
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The FTC diplomatically omitted the Supreme Court from the list of
those who have endorsed the fallacious argument that the merger of a
failing firm cannot substantially lessen competition. But Mr. Chief Justice
Warren himself once endorsed this argument" and Mr. Justice Douglas,
in the Citizen case, cited with apparent approval a district court opinion
which applied the failing company doctrine and justified it through this
fallacious reasoning. 6
Nevertheless, it now seems that this particular "logical" basis for the
doctrine is dead. It is not repeated in Citizen, and FTC Commissioner
Elman's dissent in United States Steel Corp. repudiates it as sharply as
does the majority opinion." Its absurdity, therefore, is probably now
clear to all. Indeed, if it were true that the merger of a failing company
could not substantially lessen competition, there would not be any need
for a failing company doctrine since such a merger would not violate
Section 7.
The elimination of this inaccurate basis leaves the field to congressional
intent, a much stronger substructure since logic is not needed to sustain
it. Logic is necessary, however, to interpret it. The question of the reason
for this congressional intent now becomes of prime importance, since
any interpretation of the doctrine depends on the nature of the now su-
preme congressional purpose.
This problem, however, is completely ignored by the Supreme Court in
Citizen, where Justice Douglas classified the failing company defense as a
"judicially created doctrine". 28 The fact that Congress endorsed it in
1949-50 was completely ignored. 2 And, of course, what the Court can
create, the Court can change or annul. Yet the Court in Citizen did not
even bother to exploit this assumption of authority by considering its
judicial purpose in creating the doctrine, although there was a reference
to its great depression origins.30 In fact, International Shoe was decided
before that depression became severe and concerned a firm which failed
in the 1920 recession.3' But this apparent misinterpretation of the doc-
trine's judicial origins makes little difference since Citizen ignored the
whole problem of the doctrine's purpose, judicial or congressional.
The FTC, however, both majority and minority, not only acknowl-
25. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319 (1962).
26. See notes 18-19 supra.
27. United States Steel Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. ff 18,626, at 20,990 (FTC 1969).
28. 394 U.S. at 136.
29. H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949); S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1950).
30. 394 U.S. at 138.
31. See Low, supra note 1, at 427.
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edged the congressional, and thus powerful, basis of the doctrine 2 but
also, as discussed later, used such purpose correctly as the basis for
interpreting the doctrine. It is to be hoped that the Supreme Court will
not continue to ignore unquestioned fact. Fortunately the congressional
endorsement of the doctrine has been admitted by the Court in the past.33
As long as the presumed lack of effect on competition is the major
logical basis of the doctrine, the defense is naturally absolute. But, with
congressional incorporation now predominate as the basis, it can be
argued that the defense is merely relative (i.e., rebuttable) if that were
the congressional intent. In effect, the absolute view is an illustration (if
not a completely logical one) of the common law ancillary rule of reason-
that which makes a restraint of trade legal where it is necessary for and
subordinate to an otherwise valid contract.34
If the failing company doctrine, however, is viewed as relative rather
than as absolute, the ancillary rule (or simply exemption by congressional
fiat) gives way to the balancing rule of reason, under which the advan-
tages and disadvantages of a merger must be weighed and the decision
given according to the net advantage or disadvantage. This approach is
now embraced by the FTC majority,35 but presents some severe inter-
pretive problems. Two are especially outstanding: reconciling the record
with congressional support for a balancing, relative approach, and decid-
ing what weight to accord the fact that one firm in a merger is failing.
The first problem is logically insolvable. The record shows clearly that
Congress intended the failing company doctrine to be an absolute defense.
The only evidence to the contrary that the Commission has presented is
irrelevant. It quotes a statement by Congressman Wright Patman (D.
Tex.) supporting a relative approach to the failing company defense."0
But Congressman Patman neither is nor was a member of the House
Judiciary Committee nor its Antitrust Subcommittee, and the statement
was made not in floor debate on the Celler-Kefauver Act but as testimony
before the Senate committee. Thus, it is no more relevant than any other
statement made by a witness prior to the drafting of the bill and the com-
mittee report by the Senate committee. In addition, as Commissioner
Elman pointed out in his dissent, the FTC itself until recently "has
32. United States Steel Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. U 18,626, at 20,977-80 (majority
opinion), 20,991-94 (dissenting opinion) (FTC 1969).
33. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319 (1962).
34. R. Low, The Economics of Antitrust 16 (1968). One could argue that the failing firm's
obligations to its creditors and stockholders are incorporated into the merger "contract" and
that the protection of these interests is the failing company's primary motive for entering
into that contract.
35. United States Steel Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. U 18,626, at 20,981 (FTC 1969).
36. Id. at 20,980 n.10.
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regularly granted premerger clearances in cases where the mergers would
be clear violations of law under the views now expressed [by it] .""
But we cannot stop there. The relative approach, although unsupported
by the congressional record, is now the approach of the FTC. And the
Supreme Court itself has been known to interpret congressional intent
in the antitrust field in ways that would seem equally unsupported by the
record.38 Thus we must proceed to the next question, that of determining
how much weight to accord the fact that one firm in a merger is failing
in striking a balance either for or against that merger.
We are advised by one legal study to weigh the effects upon competition
of a merger by a failing firm "according to the laws of economics.""
Such an appeal must warm the heart of a lawyer-economist. But unfor-
tunately, the "laws" of economics are sometimes no better interpreted
than those of Congress. Moreover, we are faced with the additional prob-
lem that some factors favoring a merger by a failing firm may be irrele-
vant to the concept of competition, and, in a theoretical sense, perhaps
completely outside of economic considerations.
In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,40 the Supreme Court
held that some lessening of competition in some market makes a merger
violative of Section 7, irrespective of how much it may increase competi-
tion in other ways in the same market, or in any way in other markets.
Since then, the illogical position sometimes prevails that where such a
subsidiary adverse impact on competition can be shown, any favorable
effect on competition is a question not of "competition" but of the public
interest aside from competition. If that sentence does not sound logical,
neither is that view of the law. But it is so prevalent that even great
benefits to competition arising from mergers are brushed aside as being
only in the public interest, and thus, not legally relevant to Section 7
which does not mention such a consideration. 4'
Note, however, that even this illogical position breaks down when con-
sidering the failing company doctrine, for Congress specifically included
the public interest in preventing bankruptcies as a consideration in that
defense. The now dominant view seems to be that protection of stock-
holder, creditor, employee, and community interests against bankruptcy
37. Id. at 20,992 n.15 (dissenting opinion).
38. An example of the Supreme Court's action is seen in giving the FTC the power to
seek preliminary injunctions in merger cases after it had admitted for decades that Congress
had not given it that power. FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966). This case is
probably one of the worst of the "Warren Court's" antitrust decisions. Justices Fortas,
Harlan, Stewart and White dissented.
39. Comment, supra note 8, at 920.
40. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
41. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 7, at 80.
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is the major reason for congressional endorsement of the failing company
doctrine.42 Thus, considerations aside from the lessening of competition
appear to be permitted when the failing company defense is raised.
The view that the failing company doctrine provides only a relative
defense would have two possible effects. First, it would probably make
possible the consideration of such noncompetitive factors as the needs of
"[c]reditors, owners, employees-all [of whom] could have an interest
in avoiding a total collapse or in realizing as high a selling price as pos-
sible." 43 And second, it should certainly make relevant such pro-com-
petitive factors favoring mergers as the need to provide a method of exit
for failing firms in order to encourage both risk by existing firms and
the entry of new firms with a high possibility of failure. It has been
argued that bankruptcy as the economic penalty for failure is necessary
to promote the best economic allocation of resources." This viewpoint,
however, confuses the need for eliminating inefficient or unsuccessful
firms with the need for some "moral, economic" penalty. The former is
indisputable; the latter is indefensible. Indeed, this is one area where the
judicial view is furthest removed from economic reality. The courts have
so completely failed to see that opportunities for nondisastrous exit are
necessary to encourage entry that at times they even list the number of
withdrawals as proof of declining competition instead of as evidence of
vigorous competition.45
My view remains what it was, namely, that the failing company defense
should be a relative rather than an absolute one."" But I agree with Com-
missioner Elman that congressional intent was otherwise, and that, except
on constitutional issues, only Congress can change what Congress decrees.
The Supreme Court in Citizen did not address itself directly to the
problem of whether the failing company doctrine was an absolute or a
relative defense. One statement, however, lended itself to the interpreta-
tion that the protection of stockholder or of creditor interests, if a factor
at all, was merely a relative one. Consequently, the partial or complete
42. United States v. Third Nat'1 Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 187 (1968); United States Steel
Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. U[ 18,626, at 20,981, 20,977, 20,982, 20,987, 20,989 (FTC 1969).
43. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
Harv. L. Rev. 226, 340 (1960), quoted in United States Steel Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep.
f 18,626, at 20,996 (FTC 1969) (dissenting opinion).
44. Miller, Concentration, Competition and Monopoly: A Guideline Proposal for
Horizontal Merger Policy, 12 Antitrust Bull. 881, 882 (1967).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277 (1966). See also Low,
Ease of Entry: A Fundamental Economic Defense in Merger Cases, 36 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
515, 528-29 (1968).
46. Low, supra note 1, at 444.
1969]
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destruction of these interests in the absence of a merger was apparently
not enough to invoke the doctrine:
[W]e know from the broad experience of the business community since 1930, the
year when the International Shoe case was decided, that companies reorganized
through receivership, or through Chapter X or Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act
often emerged as strong competitive companies. The prospects of reorganization of
the Citizen in 1940 would have to be dim or nonexistent to make the failing company
doctrine applicable to this case. 47
Here again Mr. Justice Douglas enunciated a statement contrary to
the whole history of the doctrine, ignored its 1950 incorporation by
Congress into the meaning of the statute, and ignored as well the multiple
problems raised by his own remarks. Are creditor and stockholder inter-
ests now irrelevant or simply not, for some reason, important enough in
this case? Are employee and community interests of greater importance?
Presumably employee and community interests may be served better by
reorganization than creditor and stockholder interests. Must a company
show unsuccessful "affirmative" efforts to reorganize as well as similar
efforts to corral other prospective purchasers?
It seems significant to note here that the FTC majority in United States
Steel Corp. held, under its relative approach, that larger stockholder inter-
ests held by fewer stockholders were less important in the balance than
smaller stockholder interests held by more stockholders.48 This distinction
seems to be a clear case of political preferences translated into legal stan-
dards. Certainly no legal justification for such a peculiar view was given.
IV. THE MEANING OF "FAILING"
As of two years ago, a wide variety of financial conditions which might
qualify a company for a "failing" status under the doctrine had been
considered by the courts. The strictest was bankruptcy, but few view-
points were that severe.49 Even the Supreme Court, in Citizen, quoted
the International Shoe statement that the failing firm in that case was
facing "the grave probability of a business failure,""0 surely a less des-
perate state than bankruptcy or even insolvency. Yet, as the above quota-
tion 5' on reorganization shows, even bankruptcy itself may not be enough
today. There may be a new test of "failing" requiring, under some, or
possibly under all circumstances, the absence of a likely prospect that
the firm has any future at all, before or after bankruptcy. This test has a
47. 394 U.S. at 138.
48. See United States Steel Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 18,626, at 20,989 (FTC 1969).
49. See Low, supra note 1, at 437-42.
50. 394 U.S. at 137. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 12, at 6684.
51. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
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certain facile similarity to a requirement that a plea of justifiable or ex-
cusable homicide can only be valid where the victim was dead, or sure
to die, before the homicide.
Since majority, minority, and hearing examiner in United States Steel
Corp. all agreed that Certified Industries was a failing company, that case
has not clarified the FTC's meaning of "failing". The major factor
seemed to be that Certified did not have sufficient access to working
capital to remain independent. 2 Moreover, a recent FTC advisory opin-
ion reverted to the intellectually weak "existence of profit" test, rather
than the far more logical "rate of profit" test.14 Apparently any profit,
therefore, no matter how insufficient to attract necessary funds, is con-
sidered by both the FTC and the Supreme Court" as a strong factor
against a failing status.
In a recent case decided under the Bank Merger Act of 196 6,15 the
Supreme Court rejected a lower court's finding that inadequate manage-
ment qualified a firm as failing. At least the majority was not convinced
that adequate management could not have been recruited."0 Mr. Justice
Harlan, dissenting in part, did find adequate evidence to sustain the
lower court's holding.57 Lack of adequate management, or of much
prospect of adequate management, therefore, may or may not offer an
acceptable argument for failing in non-bank cases. Since 1963 the Su-
preme Court has recognized that a greater public interest in safe banking
might lead to a less stringent standard of "failing" for banks than for
other firms.58 And it is interesting to note that the Pabst Brewing Com-
pany made the very practical argument that new management may be
hard to recruit in some companies, including itself, because "there is a
slightly undesirable social stigma connected with the industry.""0
The meaning of "failure", therefore, has not received much clarification
recently. Nevertheless, the wide variety of definitions which have devel-
oped may prove more useful than confusing if a relative view of this
52. United States Steel Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 9 18,626, at 20,976, 20,977.
53. Advisory Opinion Digest No. 291, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 11 18,528, at 20,880-81 (FTC
1968).
54. See United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964). And the Justice
Department even rejects loss "for a period of time" as proof of a "failing" status. See
Merger Guidelines, supra note 12, at 6684.
55. 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (Supp. 1966).
56. United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 190-91 (1968).
57. Id. at 194-95 (dissenting opinion).
58. United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 n.46 (1963).
59. Reply Brief for Defendant, supra note 16, at 21. In the lastest round of this case, the




defense becomes dominant. Different definitions may then show, not con-
fusion, but different degrees or likelihood of failure.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The failing company doctrine, despite its recent stricter interpretation,
remains by far the most widely accepted and argued defense in merger
cases. Indeed, in the future it may be even more dominant. If the prefer-
ence for conglomerate purchasers for failing firms continues, the present
large number of conglomerate mergers and interest in developing the law
of conglomerate mergers may greatly increase the instances in which it
is pleaded.60 Further, if the view that it is a relative defense becomes dom-
inant, a "partially failing" status may be argued as a "partial defense"
(along with others), thus making it even more prevalent. But if this grow-
ing importance develops without further clarification of the doctrine, its
increased application may save some mergers without making the stan-
dard of which mergers should be legal any more logical.
Whether or not Schiller was right in remarking that the gods them-
selves battle in vain against stupidity, it is very difficult for us mortals
to do so. Too much attention has been given to the rule of reason as a
legal "gimmick"; too little attention to it as the means of dividing eco-
nomically desirable from undesirable business practices, in this instance,
desirable from undesirable mergers. It is very hard to believe that ques-
tioning whether a firm advertised sufficiently for other purchasers, or
requiring the counting of the number of stockholders, are rules having
much to do with creating a logical dividing line. But the progress made
toward a rational failing company doctrine in merger cases has been so
great in a mere two years that there is reason to hope that what may be
too hard for the gods or for us mortals may be within the ability of the
courts and the FTC. A rational law of mergers may yet develop.
60. The Justice Department's Merger Guidelines set somewhat easier concentration stan-
dards for accepting a failing company plea in a conglomerate merger. See Merger Guidelines,
supra note 12, at 6689.
